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CHAPTER 14 
Zoning and Land Use 
RICHARD G. HUBER* 
§ 14.1. Eminent Domain- Rent Control. During the Survey year, in a 
case on appeal from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Fresh 
Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan/ the United States Supreme 
Court determined the applicability of the taking clauses in the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments to a city ordinance forbidding the demolition of 
an apartment building until all tenants have voluntarily vacated the prem-
ises.2 The appellant, Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. ("Fresh Pond"), 
wanted to raze an apartment building that came under the jurisdiction of 
the Cambridge Rent Control Act.3 Fresh Pond could not do so, however, 
without the Cambridge Rent Control Board's permission to remove the 
property from the rental housing market due to the limitations imposed by 
Cambridge City Ordinance 926.4 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court found the ordinance constitutional.5 On appeal, the United States 
Supreme Court dismissed the suit for lack of a federal question.6 Justice 
Rehnquist, in a memorandum decision, dissented.7 
According to Justice Rehnquist, Ordinance 926 gave the Rent Control 
Board unlimited discretion in deciding when to grant a removal permit. 8 
He found the ordinance flawed because it failed to balance the benefit 
afforded to tenants and the housing market by denying a removal permit 
* RICHARD G. HUBER is Dean and Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
The author thanks Francis K. Chowdry and Irwin B. Schwartz for their major contributions 
in the preparation of this chapter. 
§ 14.1. I 104 s. Ct. 218 (1983). 
2 /d. at 219. 
3 /d. at 218. 
4 Jd. See Cambridge, Mass., Ordinance 926 (August 13, 1979). 
5 Jd. In Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Rent Control Board of Cambridge, 388 
Mass. 1051, 446 N.E.2d 1060 (1983), the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a superior court 
decision. The superior court, relying on Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152, 418 
N.E.2d (1981), had found the restrictions against removing rental units from the market 
embodied in Cambridge, Mass., Ordinance 926 constitutional. 104 S. Ct. at 218. 
6 104 S. Ct. at 218. 
7 /d. Justice Rehnquist noted that because the case was on appeal, not on certiorari, the 
Court acted on the merits of the case. /d. 
8 /d. 
1
Huber: Chapter 14: Zoning and Land Use
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1983
420 1983 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 14.2 
against the landlord's right to put his property to other use.9 Rehnquist 
analogized the case to Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. ,10 
in which the United States Supreme Court held that even a minor physical 
invasion of real property constitutes a taking under the fifth and four-
teenth amendments Y In Rehnquist' s view, Ordinance 926 effected a 
physical occupation of property which amounted to a taking. 12 He distin-
guished the Supreme Court's finding in Block v. Hirsh 13 because in that 
case the rent control statute found constitutional was a temporary mea-
sure to cope with a wartime emergency housing crisis, and not a perma-
nent scheme such as Cambridge Ordinance 926.14 
The reasoning in the Rehnquist dissent may be valid in situations 
where, for example, one recalcitrant tenant refuses to vacate in the face of 
a building owner's desire to renovate. Yet, if it had been adopted, the 
precedent Rehnquist's reasoning could have provided to the unscrupulous 
is disturbing. A court, for example, might have applied it to the very 
different situation where many tenants are to be removed from a rent-
controlled building at one time. In using Fresh Pond this way, a federal 
court might incorrectly preempt legislation enacted to deal with a local 
emergency, such as a housing shortage, of which it has little knowledge. 
§ 14.2. Eminent Domain- Public Utilities- Relocation Act. InN orfolk 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Chesapeake and Potomac 
Telephone Company of Virginia 1 the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered whether public utilities are entitled to the same compensation 
under the Uniform Relocation Act as are natural persons, corporations 
and farm operations.2 The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. 
("C&P") was forced to relocate, and in some instances abandon, a 
number of its underground transmission facilities because of federally 
funded urban renewal projects undertaken by the Norfolk Redevelopment 
and Housing Authority ("NRHA").3 These facilities included manholes, 
conduits, cables and accessory fittings which C&P had placed in the 
9 !d. at 218-19. 
10 458 u.s. 419 (1982). 
11 !d. at 421. 
12 104 S. Ct. at 219. 
13 256 u.s. 135 (1921). 
14 104 S. Ct. at 219-20. Justice Rehnquist concluded that there was no foreseeable end to 
the housing shortage in Cambridge. /d. at 219. In addition, Justice Rehnquist found that "the 
Massachusetts statute ensuring a fair net operating income to a landlord" did not alter the 
fact that the owner was deprived of the basic property right to exclude. /d. at 220. Justice 
Rehnquist noted that the Board is not required to compensate the owner for the loss of 
control over the use of his property. /d. 
§ 14.2. I 104 s. Ct. 304 (1983). 
2 /d. at 306-07. The Uniform Relocation Act is found in 42 U.S.C. §§ 4621-38 (1982). 
3 104 S. Ct. at 306. 
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public rights-of-way of certain streets altered by the urban renewal pro-
ject.4 
The Court held that, as a matter of common law, public utilities such as 
C&P are not "displaced persons" to be compensated for any act of 
eminent domain.5 Reviewing the legislative history of the Relocation Act, 
the Court found that Congress never intended for public utilities to be 
recompensed. 6 
The Court noted that if C&P were forced to relocate part of its business, 
such as a branch office, then the government would have to compensate 
it,7 In the present situation, however, the Court found that C&P sought 
compensation for relocating aspects of its business, utility conduits, 
which are unique to utilities and are denied compensation under federal 
law.8 In matters of eminent domain, the Court noted, federal principles 
derive from the common law of the states.9 For the most part, the Court 
stated, traditional common law has maintained that permits which allow 
utilities to use public ways are subservient and utilities must pay for the 
relocation for utility facilities .10 Citing New Orleans Gas Co. v. Drainage 
Commission, 11 the Court observed that it had long adhered to the rule that 
a power company has no compensable property right in its transmission 
facilitiesP Referring to the principle of statutory construction that com-
mon law should not be deemed repealed absent clear language to that 
effect, the Court discussed the testimony of Senator Edmund Muskie, 
principal sponsor of the Relocation Act. Muskie's testimony pointed out 
the lack of uniformity in dealing with persons affected by a taking of land 
by federally assisted programs.13 The Court then noted the similarities 
between the Relocation Act and the relocation provisions in the 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 ("Highway Act of 1968").14 The lan-
guage of the relocation provisions and the formula for calculating reloca-
tion benefits found in the Relocation Act, according to the Court, were 
taken from the Highway Act of 1968.15 Based on the comparison, the 
4 ld. 





10 /d. (citing 12 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,§ 34.74a(3d ed. 
1970); 4A P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN,§ 15.22 (J. Sackman rev. 3d ed. 
1970)). 
11 197 u.s. 453 (1905). 
12 104 S. Ct. at 307,311. 
13 Id. at 308 (citing 115 Cong. Rec. 31533 (1969)). 
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Court then concluded that the claims made by C&P in Norfolk could not 
be sustained because the claims would have been denied by the relocation 
provisions of the Highway Act of 1968.16 The Court noted that utility 
relocation expenses had been specifically addressed by Congress in sec-
tion 153 of the Highway Act of 1968Y According to the Court, this 
provision showed that Congress considered the utility relocation problem 
as "separate and distinct from the plight of 'displaced' persons." 18 
The Court then turned to the report of the Senate Committee on Public 
Works. As a result of the recommendations found in this report, the Court 
noted, the Highway Act of 1968 was adopted with a provision mandating 
reimbursement by the federal government to states who, in accordance 
with state law, paid a utility relocation charge necessitated by a federally-
funded highway project.19 The Court stated, however, that "no federal 
right to reimbursement was ever granted to utilities," although such 
reimbursement was available to the states.20 
InN orfolk, therefore, utility companies were held not entitled to reloca-
tion compensation. Of more significance, however, is the Court's finding 
that the rules of eminent domain are a product of state law. In terms of 
precedent, Norfolk directs future federal courts deciding eminent domain 
cases to undergo a federalism analysis that would recognize the limits on 
federal power in matters of eminent domain. In this regard it is important 
to note that, in Norfolk, the state of Virginia was an active participant in 
the urban renewal project. Consequently, Norfolk does not speak to the 
issue of what law governs - either state or federal - in projects exclu-
sively funded by federal money. 
§ 14.3. Zoning - Constitutional Law - Coin-Operated Amusement 
Devices. The issue presented to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court in Marshfield Family Skate/and, Inc. v. Town of Marshfield/ was 
whether Marshfield may prohibit the operation of commercial coin-
activated amusement devices pursuant to the town's police power.2 The 
Court answered this question in the affirmative.3 
In June, 1982, the voters of Marshfield adopted an amendment to a 
town zoning by-law ("By-Law 48") which prohibited the operation of 
'' 'any mechanical or electronic automatic device, whether coin-operated 
16 ld. at 309. 
17 ld. 
18 Id. The Court cited§ Ill of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. 
19 104 S. Ct. at 309. 
20 I d. at 310 (emphasis in original). 
§ 14.3. 1 389 Mass. 436, 450 N.E.2d 605 (1983). 
2 /d. at 436, 450 N.E.2d at 606. 
3 /d. at 440,450 N.E.2d at 607-08. The amendment was General By-Law No. 48 (art. 57 of 
the town meeting warrant). ld. at 438, 450 N.E.2d at 606-07. 
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or not' ... except private in-house use, coin-operated boxes, pool, bil-
liard and athletic training devices. " 4 Prior to approval of the by-law by the 
attorney general, the town's building inspector ordered the plaintiff mer-
chants to cease operating their amusement devices. 5 When the plaintiffs 
refused, the building inspector commenced legal action against them.6 
The attorney general approved the by-law on September 30, 1982.7 The 
plaintiffs then sought a declaration in the superior court that By-Law 48 
was invalid.8 When the superior court judge refused to invalidate the 
by-law, the plaintiffs applied for direct appellate review. 9 
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that By-Law 48 denied both equal 
protection and due process of law .10 The plaintiffs also contested the 
interpretation of a zoning by-law enacted in 1972 which prohibited "the 
commercial operation of coin-activated amusement devices in every zon-
ing district of the town. " 11 The 1972 zoning by-law, the plaintiffs asserted, 
did not prohibit the commercial use of coin-activated devices, and, if it 
did, the 1972 by-law would be invalid for the same reasons that invalidate 
By-Law 48.12 The Court held that By-Law 48 was a proper exercise of the 
town's police powerY The Court then found it unnecessary to consider 
the zoning by-law of 1972, reasoning that its provisions were more general 
and thus included in By-Law 48. 14 
In its opinion, the Court first addressed the plaintiffs' argument that the 
by-law was inconsistent with state law. The Supreme Judicial Court 
looked to Shell Oil v. Revere 15 and to John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor 
Advertising Board16 to support its view that "every presumption should 
be made in favor of the validity of a by-law.'' 17 In applying this standard, 
the Court examined the provisions of chapter 43B, section 13, which 
authorizes a municipality to enact legislation for the common good where 
the legislation is consistent with the state constitution.18 To determine 
4 /d. at 438 n.3, 450 N.E.2d at 607 n.3. 
5 /d. at 438, 450 N.E.2d at 607. G.L. c. 40, § 32 provides that all zoning by-laws enacted 
by towns must be approved by the Attorney General. 
6 389 Mass. at 438, 450 N.E.2d at 607. 
7 /d. 
8 /d. 




13 /d. at 440, 450 N .E.2d at 607-08. 
14 /d. at 440, 450 N.E.2d at 608. 
15 383 Mass. 682, 421 N.E.2d 1181 (1981) (court held that if statute serves legitimate 
interest, legislation will withstand constitutional challenge). 
16 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1978) (by-law assumed valid and, if its reasonableness 
fairly debatable, then judgment of local legislative body must be sustained). 
17 389 Mass. at 440, 450 N.E.2d at 608. 
18 /d. G.L. c. 43B is the Horne Rule Procedures Act. /d. 
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whether, in fact, local legislation is consistent with state law, the Court 
noted, the same analysis used in federal preemption cases applies.19 
The plaintiffs in Marshfield contended that the prohibition against 
coin-activated devices in By-Law 48 conflicted with chapter 140, section 
177A of the General Laws, which allows municipalities to license such 
devices.20 The Court did not find this argument compelling. Instead, the 
Court found that one purpose of section 177 A was to remove coin-
activated amusement devices from gambling law restrictions and to per-
mit municipalities to license these devices.21 According to the Court, 
By-Law 48 did not hinder this purpose. The Court also found the plain-
tiffs' reliance on Turnpike Amusement Park, Inc. v. Licensing Commis-
sion of Cambridge 22 misplaced. In Turnpike Amusement, the Court held 
that a statute permitting a municipality to suspend all machine operations 
does not confer authority to place a total ban upon all such activities.23 
The Marshfield Court found that, although municipalities may not go 
beyond a statutory grant and ban all activity, they may supplement the 
statute with by-laws which are not inconsistent with state law. 24 
Turning to the plaintiffs' second argument, the Court rejected the 
contention that By-Law 48 was unconstitutional because it violated the 
first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.25 The 
Court noted that, in Caswell v. Licensing Commission for Brockton,26 it 
had ruled that "to gain protective status . . . entertainment must be 
designed to communicate or express some idea or some information. " 27 
The Marshfield Court found video games unprotected expression because 
of a failure to demonstrate that "video games impart sufficient com-
municative ... elements to constitute protected expression. " 28 
The Court also found unpersuasive the plaintiffs' claim that the ordi-
nance should be declared facially void under the overbreadth doctrine. 
The United States Supreme Court in Young v. American Mini Theatre, 
Inc. 29 held that if a statute does not hinder the expression of free speech to 
"both [a] real [and a] substantial" degree and if the statute is amenable to 
19 389 Mass. at 440-41, 450 N.E.2d at 408 (citing Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 293 
N.E.2d 268(1973)). 
20 389 Mass. at 441, 450 N.E.2d at 608. 
21 /d. The Court relied on Commonwealth v. Macomber, 333 Mass. 298, 130 N.E.2d 545 
(1955). 
22 343 Mass. 435, 179 N.E.2d 322 (1962). 
23 /d. at 438, 179 N.E.2d at 324. 
24 389 Mass. at 442, 450 N.E.2d at 609. 
25 /d. 
26 387 Mass. 864, 444 N.E.2d 922 (1983). 
27 /d. at 868, 444 N.E.2d at 925. 
28 389 Mass. at 443, 450 N.E.2d at 609. 
29 427 u.s. 50 (1976). 
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a "narrowing construction," the overbreadth doctrine may not be used.30 
Following this reasoning, the Marshfield Court ruled that the prohibition 
of one form of entertainment is not substantial overbreadthY 
The plaintiffs next contended that the town statute violated due process 
and equal protection as guaranteed by the state and federal constitu-
tions. 32 The Court found that because the right to work or to pursue one's 
business was not a fundamental right, triggering strict judicial scrutiny, 
the by-law needed only be rationally related to and serve a legitimate 
purpose to survive a constitutional challenge.33 In terms of due process, 
the Court concluded that By-Law 48 bore a " 'reasonable relation to a 
permissible objective of the police power.' " 34 The Court noted that the 
town in Marshfield had shown that the automatic amusement devices 
contributed to the noise, traffic and congestion problems of Marshfield.35 
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection argument. Ac-
cording to the Court, equal protection analysis required a determination 
of whether Marshfield's clas!ification furthered a legitimate state interest 
under the minimum rationality test. 36 The Court found that if the town of 
Marshfield determined that coin-operated devices posed a greater threat 
to public welfare than do other forms of recreation, then the town could 
ban such activity.37 
The Marshfield case demonstrates the Court's unwillingness to inter-
fere in local matters. A municipality's exercise of its police power is 
usually deferred to by courts when such problems as traffic congestion 
and noise are involved. The Marshfield Court followed the prevailing 
judicial tendency to pursue the least obtrusive course in matters of local 
concern. A town's use of the police power, of course, is not restricted to 
matters of land use and zoning. Consequently, the Marshfield decision 
may provide precedent for those arguing against judicial activism in cases 
involving the exercise of local police powers. 
§ 14.4. Eminent Domain - Calculation of Compensation. In Young 
Men's Christian Association of Quincy v. Sandwich Water District, 1 the 
Appeals Court of Massachusetts considered how much a municipality 
30 !d. at 60. 
31 389 Mass. at 445, 450 N.E.2d at 610. 
32 /d. 
33 /d. at 445, 450 N .E.2d at 611. 
34 /d. (quoting John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206,216,339 
N.E.2d 709, 716 (1975)). 
35 389 Mass. at 446-47, 450 N.E.2d at 611. 
36 /d. at 447-48, 450 N.E.2d at 612. 
37 /d. at 448, 450 N.E.2d at 612. 
§ 14.4. 1 16 Mass. App. Ct. 666, 454 N.E.2d 514 (1983). 
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exercising its eminent domain power should compensate a private entity. 2 
The defendant, Sandwich Water District (the "District"), took by emi-
nent domain land located in South Sandwich belonging to the plaintiff, the 
Y.M.C.A.3 The land was situated over the Mashpee Pitted Outwash Plain, 
a geographical formation rich in potable water.4 At the time of the taking, 
the land was undeveloped, part of a campsite.5 The Y.M.C.A. brought 
suit in the superior court for damages.6 A jury found for the plaintiff in the 
amount of $1,500,000.7 The defendant appealed.8 
According to the Appeals Court, three different sources of information 
on the value of the land were considered by the superior court.9 First, 
three real estate appraisers gave opinions based on comparable sales 
data.10 The second source was the finding of a judge in a previous bench 
trial. 11 The third opinion came from a real estate appraiser named Col-
eman who had calculated the value based on capitalization of the income 
from the land if used as a water resource and determined that the land was 
worth $1,200,000. 12 The Appeals Court concluded that the trial court 
jury's $1,500,000 award could only have been based upon the Coleman 
opinion. 13 
The District argued that the trial judge erred in allowing into evidence 
expert opinion analyzing the capitalization of income approach without 
first finding that it was impossible to determine the value of the land by 
reference to comparable sales. 14 The Appeals Court rejected this conten-
tion, stating that, since the sales market approach and income approach 
are both based upon a property's income producing potential, both meth-
ods "should produce roughly comparable results with respect to certain 
kinds of commercial property.'' 15 The court distinguished cases requiring 
a preliminary showing of comparable sales data, finding that they were 
concerned with the proposed use of depreciated-cost evidence, an analy-
sis that departs from the impartiality of the market data basis. 16 The court 
2 /d. at 667, 454 N.E.2d at 516. 
3 ld. 
4 ld. at 675, 454 N.E.2d at 520. 
5 ld. at 667, 454 N.E.2d at 516. 
6 ld. G.L. c. 79, § 14 provides that a "person entitled to an award of ... damages ... 
may petition for the assessment of such damages to the superior court . . . . " 




11 ld. at 668, 454 N.E.2d at 516. 
12 ld. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. at 668, 454 N.E.2d at 517. 
15 /d. . 
16 ld. In Newton Girl Scout Council v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 335 Mass. 189, 
8
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therefore held that it was within the trial court's discretion to admit 
evidence of value based on income capitalization even though comparable 
sales data was availableY 
The defendant next argued that the Coleman approach should have 
been excluded from evidence because, under town of Sandwich zoning, 
the land could not be used as a commercial water resource. 18 The Col-
eman approach, the defendant contended, determined income on the 
basis of a potential commercial venture. 19 The defendant cited Roach v. 
Newton Redevelopment Authority ,20 for the proposition that "care must 
be taken to distinguish between availability which is peculiar to the 
government ... and availability for public use." 21 The court found this 
argument without merit.22 A Sandwich zoning by-law, the court observed, 
states that special permits shall normally be granted to allow for the 
extraction of water on a commercial basis unless a nuisance would result 
to surrounding landholders.23 According to the court, no evidence was 
presented that the extraction of water would cause a nuisance.24 In fact, 
the court noted, other neighboring landlords had been permitted to oper-
ate their land as a commercial water resource.25 
Although the Appeals Court held Coleman's testimony admissible, the 
court found that the figures were inaccurate because they were computa-
tions of gross income and not net income. 26 According to the court, gross 
income cannot be used for capitalization purposes absent assurances that 
no expenses are required to produce salesP Costs such as well drilling, 
pumping equipment and housing, pipes, water storage, salaries and 
138 N.E.2d 769 (1954), the Court recognized that no ready and willing market exists for 
special purpose property such as that used for churches and many other non-profit purposes, 
and thus fair market value cannot be shown by sales. ld. at 194-95, 138 N.E.2d at 773. The 
Newton Girl Scout Court also relied upon the "cost of land plus reproduction cost" 
approach. ld. In Commonwealth v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 352 Mass. 143, 224 
N.E.2d 186 (1%7), the Court held that an alternative to the market test must be used to 
determine a reasonable value of special purpose property. Id. at 147-48, 224 N.E.2d at 
189-90. Yet it is important to note that, in YMCA, a ready and willing market for the 
plaintiff's land existed. 
17 16 Mass. at 668, 454 N.E.2d at 517. 
18 ld. 
19 Id. 
20 381 Mass. 135, 407 N.E.2d 1251 (1980). 
21 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 669, 454 N.E.2d at 517 (quoting Roach v. Newton Development 
Authority, 381 Mass. 135, 139, 407 N.E.2d 1251, 1254). 
22 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 669-70, 454 N.E.2d at 517. 
23 I d. at 670,454 N.E.2d at 517. See The Town of Sandwich Zoning By-Law, Art. I,§ 1330 
(1973). 
24 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 670, 454 N.E.2d at 517. 
25 ld. 
26 Jd. at 672, 454 N.E.2d at 518. 
27 Id. 
9
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supplies for maintenance personnel, and power to run the pumps were not 
considered when Coleman computed his figure. 28 The court therefore 
found that the trial judge had erred in allowing an appraisal based on 
capitalization of gross income ''to go to the jury without showing that 
gross income would be substantially identical to net income." 29 
In conclusion, the court found Coleman's valuation inaccurate because 
it valued the water that could be produced rather than the land taken.30 
The whole southern area of Sandwich, the court noted, sits on top of an 
outwash plain, rich in water resources. Because of the large size of the 
plain, the jury's consideration of the plaintiff's land as the only access 
point to the water supply was in error. 31 On the basis of the Coleman 
opinion, the court noted, the jury had valued the land at $36,135.87 per 
acre, a figure computed on the basis of the District's selection of the land 
as the location for its wells.32 According to the court, if the District chose 
another parcel, the value of the plaintiff's land would be only $3,000 per 
acre. 33 Consequently, the court found the jury award inconsistent with the 
principle ''that the owner of the land which is taken is not to receive any 
enhancement in value based on the contemplated improvement. " 34 
In sum, the Appeals Court in YMCA examined the rather complicated 
economic capitalization formulae used by the lower courts. The court 
upheld the use of evidence which values land based on the capitalization 
of net income even when valid comparable sales data is available. 35 In the 
end, however, the court decided the case on a well-established principle 
which has governed decisions in similar eminent domain cases. This 
principle is that the value of land taken by eminent domain must be 
computed without considering its enhanced value due to the contemplated 
improvement or use. 
§ 14.5. Restrictions on Wetlands - Taking. The issue before the Ap-
peals Court of Massachusetts in Englander v. Department of Environmen-
tal Management, 1 was whether restrictions imposed by a municipality on 
the filling, draining or dredging of private property located in a wetland 
area were so extreme as to constitute a taking without compensation.2 
The land in question, twenty-five acres located in the town of Westwood, 
28 Id. at 672, 454 N.E.2d at 519. 
29 Id. at 673, 454 N.E.2d at 519. 
30 Id. at 675, 454 N.E.2d at 520. 
31 ld. 
32 Id. at 675, 454 N.E.2d at 520. 
33 Id. at 677, 454 N.E.2d at 521. 
34 ld. 
35 ld. 
§ 14.5. 1 16 Mass. App. Ct. 943, 450 N.E.2d 1120 (1983). 
2 ld. at 944, 450 N.E.2d at 1121. 
10
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was part of a larger, forty-seven acre tract straddling the Norwood-
Westwood boundary line.3 The land in Norwood had been developed into 
a 250 unit apartment building.4 The plaintiff was prevented from develop-
ing the Westwood land by an order issued by the Commissioner of 
Natural Resources prohibiting the filling, draining or dredging of about 
half of the Westwood land, and stating that no building could be placed on 
that parcel, even though it was zoned for single family use.5 The plaintiff 
petitioned to the superior court for a finding that these restrictions consti-
tuted a taking.6 
At trial, the testimony indicated that the plaintiff wanted to erect 
apartment buildings on the Westwood land similar to those located in 
Norwood, that the topography ofthe Westwood land was similar to that in 
Norwood, and that the Westwood parcel could be reached only through 
the Norwood land.7 The trial judge held that the defendant's order was 
tantamount to a taking, and that, by prohibiting the plaintiff from develop-
ing the land, the order "reduced the value of the land to that of recrea-
tional limited use. " 8 
On appeal, the Appeals Court reversed, finding that Moskow v. Com-
missioner of the Department of Environmental Management ,9 decided by 
the Supreme Judicial Court subsequent to the trial court's decision, con-
trolled.10 According to the Englander court, the Supreme Judicial Court 
had found that a comparable order was not a taking in Moskow Y The 
3 Jd. at 943, 450 N.E.2d at 1120-21. 
4 Jd. at 943, 450 N.E.2d at 1120. 
5 Jd. at 943, 450 N.E.2d at 1121. The Department of Natural Resources is now the 
Department of Environmental Management. This order was promulgated pursuant to G.L. 
c. 131, § 40A, which in relevant part states: ''The commission of environmental management 
. . . shall from time to time, for the purposes of preserving and promoting the public safety, 
private property, wildlife, fisheries, water resources, flood areas and agriculture, adopt ... 
orders ... prohibiting dredging, filling, removing ... inland wetlands." 
6 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 944, 450 N.E.2d at 1121. See G.L. c. 131, § 40A. 
7 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 944, 450 N.E.2d at 1121. 
8 Jd. at 944, 450 N.E.2d at 1121. 
9 384 Mass. 530, 427 N.E.2d 750 (1981). In Moskow, the plaintiff owned an undeveloped 
tract of land in Newton.Jd. at 531, 427 N.E.2d at 751. On April 7, 1977, the commissioner 
issued a restrictive order preventing Moskow from dredging, filling or altering his property 
since it was determined that the a~a was part of a wetland.ld. at 531, 427 N.E.2d at 752. 
The superior court held that the defendant can restrict the plaintiff's use of the land for the 
purposes of environmental protection. ld. at 532, 427 N.E.2d at 752. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court agreed and further held that, .since the Commission's act was 
reasonably related to the goals of flood protection and pollution control, no unconstitutional 
taking occurred. 384 Mass. at 535, 427 N.E.2d at 753-54. The Moskow case referred to 
Pennsylvania Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In Penn. 
Central, the extent of interference was an important factor. ld. at 130-31. 
10 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 944, 450 N.E.2d at 1121. 
II Jd. 
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Appeals Court therefore held that, viewing the Englander tract as a 
whole, the restrictions on the Westwood portion are not substantial 
enough to create an undue burden on the entire tract. 12 To support its 
finding, the court noted that "there remained about twelve and one-half 
acres of land, susceptible to development for single-family house lots 
worth, as the trial judge found, $5,000 each."13 
The court in Englander apparently used a "balancing test" and found 
that the public interest in pollution control and in prevention of soil 
erosion and flooding, outweighed Englander's property right to develop 
his land as he so pleased. Yet, it is significant to note that in both 
Englander and Moskow, the respective plaintiffs had developed their land 
to some degree. The decisions do not establish that in the future the 
Massachusetts courts will prohibit all reasonable economic development 
of privately-owned land in deference to pollution or flood control acts of 
the Legislature. The Englander court was careful to note that the restric-
tions being challenged did not forbid all development of the land in 
question, although, in reality, the limited access to the Westwood parcel 
might make its use for single-family homes impractical. 
§ 14.6. Special Permits- Public Hearings- Board Member's Atten-
dance Prerequisite to Voting. During the Survey year, in Mullin v. Plan-
ning Board of Brewster, 1 the Appeals Court addressed the issue of 
whether four members of the Brewster planning board ("Board") prop-
erly voted to issue a special permit to Bay Colony Property, Inc. ("Bay 
Colony").2 In May, 1981, Bay Colony requested a special permit to 
construct a Planned Unit Development (PUD).3 According to chapter 
40A, section 9, a PUD "means a mixed use development on a plot ofland 
... in which a mixture of residential, open space, commercial, industrial 
or other uses and a variety of building types are determined to be 
sufficiently advantageous to render it appropriate to grant special permis-
sion to depart from the normal requirements of the district. " 4 In July, 
1981, a public hearing attended by only four members of the seven-
member Board was held.5 Many neighbors of the proposed PUD attended 
the meeting.6 On September 1, 1981 six members of the Board met to vote 
on the Bay Colony application, but, on the advice of legal counsel, the 
t2 Id. 
13 ld. 
§ 14.6. ' 17 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 456 N.E.2d 780 (1983). 
2 Id. at 140, 456 N.E.2d at 781. 
3 ld. 
4 G.L. c. 40A, § 9. 
5 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 140, 456 N.E.2d at 781. 
6 ld. 
12
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two members not present at the July meeting were asked to abstain from 
voting.7 The four members unanimously voted to allow Bay Colony's 
project to proceed.8 On September 10, 1981 the Board filed its decision 
with the town clerk's office pursuant to chapter 40A, section 9.9 Twenty 
days later, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the superior court pursuant to 
chapter 40A, section 17, alleging that, because of the Board's failure to 
comply with the voting requirements of chapter 40A, section 9, the vote to 
issue a special permit to Bay Colony was null and void. 10 
The superior court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment, 
but subsequently vacated that judgment on the ground that only four 
members of the Board had voted, violating the statutory requirement of a 
two-thirds majority. 11 The court then remanded the case to the Board for 
further consideration.12 On remand, the six members present at the Sep-
tember 1 meeting convened on May 4, 1982, and again voted unanimously 
to accept the Bay Colony proposaP3 The Board's motion for summary 
judgment was subsequently granted by the superior court.14 The plaintiff 
appealed. 15 
The Massachusetts Appeals Court agreed with the plaintiffs' contention 
that, because two members of the Board were not present for the public 
hearings regarding the Bay Colony project, they were not eligible to 
participate in either the May 4 or the September 1 voting.16 Consequently, 
according to the court, only four of the seven Board members could cast 
votes, an insufficient number under chapter 40A, section 9.17 Section 9 
provides that: ''Special permits issued by a special voting authority shall 
require a two-thirds vote of boards with more than five members . . . . '' 18 
In reaching its decision, the Mullin court discussed whether the Board 
was acting in a quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative capacity when granting 
the permit.19 The court noted that when a board makes a judicial or 
quasi-judicial decision, all members who vote must have been present at a 
public hearing on the issue.20 The court rejected the defendants' argument 
7 /d. 
8 /d. 
9 /d. at 140, 456 N.E.2d at 781. 
10 /d. at 140-41, 456 N.E.2d at 781. 







18 G.L. c. 40A, § 9. 
19 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 141, 456 N.E.2d at 782. 
20 /d. In Sesnovich v. Board of Appeals of Boston, 313 Mass. 393, 47 N.E.2d 943 (1958), 
the Court held that although one ofthe members of the zoning board was ill and although he 
13
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that the Board was functioning as a quasi-legislative rather than as a 
quasi-judicial body, and that therefore it was not subject to the require-
ment that all board members be present at the public hearings as a 
prerequisite to vote.21 According to the court, the Board had acted in a 
quasi-judicial fashion when granting the permit to Bay Colony .22 To 
support this finding, the court referred by analogy to the definition of an 
adjudicatory proceeding in the State Administration Procedures Act.23 In 
that act, an adjudicatory proceeding is defined as a "proceeding before an 
agency in which legal rights, duties or privileges of specifically named 
persons are required by constitutional right or by any provision of the 
General Laws to be determined after opportunity of an agency hearing.' ' 24 
In addition, the court cited Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute v. State Exam-
iners of Plumbing and Gas Fitters 25 for the proposition that a proceeding 
involving particular people, their business or property, and their relation 
to a particular transaction, as opposed to a more general question of 
governmental policy, is adjudicatory in nature.26 The Mullin court found 
that the application for a special permit affected the rights of Bay Colony 
specifically and that "given the quantum of procedural requirements 
involved in the issuance of a special permit" the proceedings before the 
Board were adjudicatory in nature. 27 As a result, the court held that only 
those members of the Board who were present at the July, 1981 public 
meeting could vote on Bay Colony's request for a special permit.28 
read the testimony, visited the premises and participated in the decision, his absence was 
fatal to the action of the board. Id. at 396, 47 N.E.2d at 946. The statute, the Court found, 
required the "entire membership of the board," and, thus, in the member's absence, the 
board was without authority to act. Id. 
21 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 142, 456 N.E.2d at 783. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 142,456 N.E.2d at 782. The State Administrative Procedure Act is found in G.L. 
c. 30A. 
24 G.L. c. 30A, § 1(1). 
25 8'Mass. APP.· Ct. 575, 396 N.E.2d 457 (1979). 
26 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 142, 456 N.E.2d at 782. The defendant relied on Hayeck v. 
Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 335 Mass. 372, 140 N.E.2d 210 (1957) (need for appropriating 
property for public use legislative, not judicial, action); on McHugh v. Board of Zoning 
Adjustment of Boston, 336 Mass. 685, 147 N.E.2d 761 (1958) (decision of zoning board not 
invalid on basis that hearing on matter attended by nine of twelve members and subsequent 
decision signed by ten members - two of whom not at hearing); and on 1958 ANN. SuRv. 
MAss. LAw.§ 14.7, at 148 (not all commissioners who vote on zoning regulation need attend 
public hearing on regulation for vote to be valid). 
27 l7 Mass. App. Ct. at 142-43, 456 N.E.2d at 782-83. In Cast Iron, the court held that a 
provision in a statute which governed the enactment of a plumbing code promoting public 
safety is political in nature. 8 Mass. App. Ct. at 586, 3% N.E.2d at 464. According to the 
Cast Iron court, a political question at the public hearing stage, which requires legislative 
rather than adjudicatory deliberation, is a legislative act. Id. 
28 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 143, 456 N.E.2d at 783. 
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The defendants further argued that they were not obligated to comply 
with chapter 40A, section 9, which requires two-thirds vote of an author-
ity having five or more members.29 Instead, according to the Board, the 
town of Brewster's Zoning By-Law, requiring " 'a c;oncurring vote of 
four or more members,' " controlled.30 The court rejected this argument, 
finding that by-laws which conflict with an enabling act will not be up-
held.31 The defendant's argument that it was authorized to reduce the 
number of board members to four in this particular instance was also 
found to be without merit.32 The Mullin court noted that in Gamache v. 
Acushnet33 it had held that a zoning board could not transform itself into a 
board with fewer members unless given specific authority to do so in the 
governing statute.34 Consequently, finding no language in chapter 40A, 
section 9, permitting such a "metamorphosis,'' the court held that the 
Board could grant a special permit only if at least five members voted for 
the Bay Colony proposal.35 
§ 14.7. Evidence- Admissibility of Zoning Board Minutes. During the 
Survey year, in Building Inspector of Chatham v. Kendrick/ the Appeals 
Court held that the minutes of a zoning board meeting are not admissible 
to prove the truth of the evidence presented to the board and recorded in 
the minutes. 
The case arose in 1980 when the building inspector brought suit in the 
superior court to enjoin the defendant, Kendrick, from conducting a 
business for repairing heavy machinery on his property.2 In 1974, 
Chatham's Zoning Board of Appeals ("Zoning Board") had granted a 
special permit to Kendrick.3 That permit specified that a building addition 
constructed by Kendrick could be used as a blacksmith shop, but could 
not be used as a repair shop for large equipment or machinery .4 In August, 
1978, the town's building inspector ordered Kendrick to cease repairing 
large trucks on his premises in violation of the 1974 permit.5 Kendrick was 
notified that to conduct such an activity in a general business zone, he 
needed a special permit allowing him to use the property as a garage for 
29 ld. 
30 Id. The defendants referred to § XI(J)(3) of the Brewster zoning law (1979) which 
requires only a concurring vote of four or more members. Id. 
31 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 143, 456 N.E.2d at 783. 
32 ld. 
33 14 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 438 N.E.2d 82 (1982). 
34 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 143, 456 N.E.2d at 783. 
35 ld. 
§ 14.7. 1 17 Mass. App. Ct. 928, 456 N.E.2d 1151 (1983)(rescript opinion). 
2 Id. at 928, 456 N.E.2d at 1151-52. 
3 Id. at 928, 456 N.E.2d at 1152. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 928-29, 456 N.E.2d at 1152. 
15
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the repair of trucks and related machinery.6 Kendrick's subsequent appli-
cation for this permit was denied by the Zoning Board. He did not appeal 
this decision. On three occasions in 1980, the building inspector again 
ordered Kendrick to cease using the property in violation of the 1974 
permit. Finally, in June 1980, a suit was instituted in the superior court to 
force Kendrick to desist from further work in violation of his permit. 7 
At trial, Kendrick asserted that his business constituted a nonconform-
ing use established prior to the existence of any zoning by-law forbidding 
such activity in Chatham.8 As a result, Kendrick maintained, he never 
used the land in violation of the 1974 permit.9 Kendrick further contended 
that his use of the land was presumptively allowed in Chatham regardless 
of any finding by the Zoning Board to the contrary .10 
The trialjudge allowed into evidence the Zoning Board's minutes ofthe 
January 9, 1974 and November 29, 1978 meetings.U These minutes con-
tained language indicating that Kendrick had begun the repair business in 
1965, after the enactment of the 1954 zoning by-law forbidding Kendrick's 
particular use of the land. 12 The record also showed that at no time during 
these meetings did Kendrick claim that the repair business was a pre-1954 
nonconforming use. 13 The trial judge made specific reference to a state-
ment in the 1978 minutes which said that Kendrick had operated his shop 
as a repair facility for light machinery at that location on a part-time basis 
since 1964.14 Although it was unclear from the minutes who made this 
statement, the trial judge concluded that the repair business had been 
operating, on at least a part-time basis, since 1965.15 
On appeal, the issue before the Massachusetts Appeals Court was 
whether the recorded minutes of the two Zoning Board meetings were 
admissible under the public records exception to hearsay .16 The court 
held that although the burden was upon Kendrick to prove his defense 
that a non-conforming use existed, the trial judge's use of the minutes was 
unacceptable. 17 








14 Id. at 930, 456 N.E.2d at 1152-53. 
15 ld. 
16 I d. at 930, 456 N .E.2d at 1153. The court noted that under the Proposed Massachusetts 
Rules of Evidence 803(8), a wide range of public records would be admissible absent 
information or chcumstances suggesting their untrustworthiness. Id. This rule, however, 
has not been adopted. 
17 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 930, 456 N.E.2d at 1152-53. 
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In deciding Kendrick, the court discussed two parts of the Massachu-
setts General Laws. First, the Appeals Court noted that chapter 39, 
section 23B provides that" 'a governmental body shall maintain accurate 
records of its meetings, setting forth the date, time, place, members 
present . . . and action taken at each meeting . . . The records of each 
meeting shall become a public record and be available to the public 
••• .' "
18 The court then referred to chapter 66, which provides that the 
record does not have to be a verbatim record of discussions.19 Based on 
these provisions, the court determined that public records are admissible 
to prove matters which the statutes require to be recorded: the date of 
meetings, members, votes, members of the board absent and the reasons 
stated for each discussion.20 The actual findings made by a zoning board, 
according to the court, have "no evidentiary weight. " 21 Consequently, 
the court decided that in Kendrick the minutes of the 1974 and 1978 
Zoning Board meetings could not be admitted ''to prove the truth of the 
evidence before the board recorded in the minutes. " 22 The court spec-
ifically stated, however, that it was not deciding whether zoning board 
minutes could be used for other purposes if supplemented by testimony 
from persons at the meeting in question or if the testimony were from 
someone who had prepared the minutes, particularly if done from a 
verbatim transcript or tape recording.23 
In sum, the Kendrick case shows that minutes from a hearing before a 
zoning board are admissible into evidence only for the limited purpose of 
proving specific matters required to be recorded by statute. The state-
ments within the minutes, however, may not be used to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. The court did suggest, however, that testimony 
establishing the accuracy of the minutes might allow them to be used for 
other purposes. 
§ 14.8. Review of Board Decisions - Findings of Fact. The issue re-
viewed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court in Lome/is v. Board of 
Appeals of Marblehead 1 was whether a structure had accidentally col-
lapsed, entitling the owner of the premises to a building permit as a matter 
18 Jd. at 930, 456 N.E.2d at 1153 (quoting G.L. c. 39 § 23B). 
19 Jd. (citing G.L. c. 66 § 5A). 
20 Jd. 
21 Jd. (citing Lawrence v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 336 Mass. 87, 142 N.E.2d 378 (1957) 
(judge may consider only evidence heard in court, not finding of board of appeals); Devine v. 
Zoning Board of Appeals of Lynn, 332 Mass. 319, 125 N.E.2d 131 (1955) (judge hearing 
appeal of grant of variance may not consider findings of zoning board of appeals.)) 
22 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 931, 456 N.E.2d at 1154. 
23 Jd. at 931, 456 N.E.2d at 1153. 
§ 14.8. 1 17 Mass. App. Ct. 962, 458 N.E.2d 740 (1983) (rescript opinion). 
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of law. 2 In Lome/is, the plaintiff Lome lis owned a seasonal home in the 
town of Marblehead which he desired to upgrade to a year-round house.3 
To accomplish this, Lome lis applied for, and was granted, a building 
permit in September 1978.4 The building inspector, aware of the problems 
presented by a coastal storm such as the blizzard of 1978, granted the 
permit contingent upon Lomelis erecting all living and utility areas thir-
teen feet above mean high tide.5 This necessitated a building "five to ten 
feet higher than the original structure and with a slight variation from the 
preexisting perimeter. " 6 
Reconstruction of the premises commenced in October, 1978.7 During 
January of 1979, with most of the foundation finished, workers decided to 
lift a wall and remove an old window sill.8 As the wall was lifted, wind 
speed in the area suddenly increased, causing the workmen to lose control 
of the wall, which crashed into and destroyed the remainder of the house.9 
The Careys, neighbors of the plaintiffs, complained to the town building 
inspector that the construction workers, and not the wind, had tom down 
the structure. 10 The inspector then rescinded the permit without notice or 
a hearing.U Lome lis contacted the inspector and presented proof that the 
collapse of the building was accidental. 12 Convinced by the evidence, the 
inspector issued a second permit. 13 The Careys appealed to the 
Marblehead Board of Appeals ("Board of Appeals") which ordered the 
second permit revoked, finding it unsupported by a building plan.14 
Lomelis promptly filed a new application for a building permit together 
with plans showing the variation required as a result of the 1978 blizzard. 15 
He also requested permission to make certain extensions to the porch and 
chimney. 16 The building inspector then granted a third permit and the 
Careys again appealed to the Board of AppealsY The Board of Appeals 
decided that the collapse was not accidental, and that, consequently, 











13 Id. at 963, 458 N.E.2d at 741-42. 
14 Id. at 963, 458 N.E.2d at 742. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 964, 458 N.E.2d at 742. 
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Lomelis retained no right to reconstruct the building. 18 On appeal, the 
superior court held that the third permit was legitimate and that Lomelis 
could proceed with his plans. 19 
The Appeals Court upheld the decision of the superior court.20 The 
court first noted that, ''although a judge of a statewide judicial system is 
no substitute for a local tribunal familiar with the local requirements of a 
particular zoning scheme, the trial court has a duty to receive evidence 
and make findings of fact independent of the decisions of a board of 
appeal. " 21 On appeal, the court stated, the trial judge's findings of fact are 
accepted unless clearly erroneous.22 The Appeals Court then accepted the 
trial judge's finding that the Lomelis house fell down accidentally.23 The 
court also agreed with the trial judge's finding that the second and third 
permits were reinstatements of the original permit, which the superior 
court found was unlawfully revoked.24 
The Lome/is case reaffirms the traditional rule regarding chapter 40A, 
section 17. The findings of local administrative bodies in Massachusetts 
do not constitute evidence useable at trial. In matters of fact and law, the 
judicial body is the final arbiter. 
§ 14.9. Notice Requirements- Appeal of Zoning Board Decision. County 
of Norfolk v. Zoning Board of Appeals ofWalpole 1 involved an interpreta-
tion of the notice requirements in chapter 40A, section 17.2 The plaintiff 
county had telephoned the defendant zoning board regarding its intention 
to appeal one of the board's decisions but had not given any written 
notice.3 That telephone call, the plaintiff asserted, satisfied the notice 
requirements of chapter 40A. 
To support its contention, the plaintiff relied upon Pierce v. Board of 
Appeals of Carver .4 In Pierce, the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that 
18 /d. 
19 /d. Lomelis appealed to the superior court pursuant to G.L. c. 40A, § 7, which provides 
in part: "(A]ny person aggrieved by a decision of the board of appeals ... may appeal to the 
Superior Court department .... " 




24 /d. at 963, 458 N.E.2d at 742. 
§ 14.9. 1 16 Mass. App. Ct. 930, 450 N.E.2d 628 (1983) (rescript opinion). 
2 /d. at 930, 450 N.E.2d at 629. G.L. c. 40A, § 17 provides in part: 
(A]ny person aggrieved by a decision of the board of appeals ... may appeal ... by 
bringing an action within twenty days after the decision has been filed in the office 
of the city or town clerk ... Notice of the action with a copy of the complaint shall be 
given to such a city or town clerk so as to be received within such twenty days. 
3 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 930, 450 N.E.2d at 629. 
4 /d. (citing Pierce v. Bd. of Appeals of Carver, 369 Mass. 804, 343 N.E.2d 412 (1976)). 
19
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dismissal of an action was not required solely because the complaint and 
summons, which were mailed first class by the plaintiff but which were 
erroneously treated as second class, did not arrive in time to satisfy the 
notice requirements of chapter 40A.5 The Pierce court noted that, with 
respect to defective notice, a judge should use his discretionary power to 
determine whether the defect was fatal to the action.6 According to the 
court, mechanical application of hard fast rules would inevitably lead to 
injustice in some cases.7 Relying upon the reasoning in Pierce, the plain-
tiff in Norfolk County argued that telephone notice was not a serious 
defect deserving dismissal of the action on appeal.8 
The Appeals Court in Norfolk County held that telephone notice is 
inadequate because it leaves nothing in the town records to warn in-
terested third parties that the zoning status of a particular parcel of land is 
still in question.9 The court rejected the plaintiff's reliance on Pierce, 
pointing out that Pierce analyzes notice requirements solely in terms of 
prejudice, whereas the issue before the court in Norfolk County con-
cerned the sufficiency of telephone notice, not prejudice. 10 
The court also rejected the plaintiff's second argument that, because 
the county was not the original party seeking appeal, it need not comply 
with service requirements.U In support of its decision, the court cited 
Twomey v. Board of Appeals of Medford, 12 and Massachusetts Bread Co. 
v. Brice, 13 for the proposition that notice requirements must be fulfilled 
regardless of the identity of the appealing party. 
The primary concern of the Norfolk County court was adequacy of 
notice to third parties whose rights might be abridged by the lack of 
accessible information regarding zoning appeal. Telephone calls, per se, 
5 Pierce, 369 Mass. at 809, 343 N.E.2d at 415. 
6 /d. at 808-09, 343 N .E.2d at 415. 
7 /d. at 809, 343 N.E.2d at 415. 
8 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 930, 450 N.E.2d at 629. 
9 /d. at 930, 450 N.E.2d at 629. The court, in holding "telephone notice" inadequate, 
relied upon Carr v. Board of Appeals of Saugus, 361 Mass. 361, 280 N.E.2d 199 (1972). In 
that case, the court found that if written notice was filed within the requisite twenty day 
appeal period, but that a copy of supplementary material, such as a bill of equity was not, 
"interested third parites would be forewarned that the zoning status ofthe land [was) still in 
question." /d. at 363, 280 N.E.2d at 200. 
10 /d. See Nightingale v. Bd. of Appeals of Methuen, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 887, 336 N.E.2d 
1064 (1979) (summary judgment granted when plaintiff failed to show written notice received 
by town clerk, resulting in prejudice to third party); Marvin v. Bd. of Appeals of Medfield, 5 
Mass. App. Ct. 772, 259 N.E.2d 318 (1977) (appeal of board of zoning appeals properly 
dismissed as untimely where not filed within statutory time limit). 
11 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 930, 450 N.E.2d at 629. 
12 7 Mass. App. Ct. 770, 390 N.E.2d 272 (1979); noted in Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 
1979 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 15.6, at 425. 
13 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1053, 434 N.E.2d 672 (1982). 
20
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1983 [1983], Art. 17
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1983/iss1/17
§ 14.10 ZONING AND LAND USE 439 
without recording or transcription, do not constitute readily available 
memoranda warning ''interested third parties'' that the zoning status of a 
piece of land is in question. Because of this desire to protect the rights of 
innocent third parties, it is unlikely that the Massachusetts courts will 
lower the chapter 40A standard requiring written and recorded notice of 
appeal in the future. 
§ 14.10. Variances - Standing - Tenants. A person does not have 
standing to contest a variance granted pursuant to chapter 40A, section 17 
unless "aggrieved by a decision of the board of appeals." 1 In Reeves v. 
Board of Zoning Appeal of Cambridge ,2 the plaintiff, Reeves, was a 
tenant in an eight-unit apartment building which the owner, Sherwood, 
wanted to subdivide into four two-story townhouses.3 Sherwood discov-
ered that, prior to subdividing, he had to correct certain deficiencies to 
comply with a Cambridge zoning ordinance.4 Instead of making the 
changes, he sold the building to defendant Clark, who requested, and was 
granted, a variance from the Cambridge Zoning Board of Appeal.5 
Alleging reliance on chapter 40A, section 17, Reeves filed a complaint 
in superior court contesting the variance grant.6 His main contention was 
that the subdivision and subsequent sale of the building would result in 
four owner-occupied dwellings which would probably not be subject to 
the restrictions of the Cambridge Rent Control Ordinance.7 Each defen-
dant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. 8 The Appeals Court held that 
since Reeves was not a ''person aggrieved'' by the granting of a variance, 
he did not have standing to object to the townhouse conversion.9 Accord-
ing to the court, Reeves had not alleged ownership of land in the neigh-
borhood or any interest which entitled him to protection under the zoning 
ordinance. 10 
Reeves had argued that, although there is a presumption that land-
owners are "persons aggrieved" because they are entitled to a mailed 
§ 14.10. I G.L. c. 40A, § 17. 
2 16 Mass. App. Ct. 1011, 455 N.E.2d 447 (1983) (rescript opinion). 
3 /d. at 1011, 455 N.E.2d at 447-48. The complainant, Reeves, was possibly only a tenant 
at sufferance. Id. at 1012, 455 N.E.2d at 448. He had been served with a notice to quit for 
nonpayment of rent. Id. at 1012 n.2, 455 N.E.2d at 448 n.2. 
4 Id. at 1011,455 N.E.2d at 448. The board found a gap between the fire walls and the roof 
and a minor deficiency in sideyard space. 
5 Id. at 1011 & n.2, 455 N.E.2d at 448 & n.2. The board granted the variance allowing 
subdivision on March 9, 1981, but also requiring separate water lines and utilities for each 
townhouse, and the completion of firewalls between the units. Id. 
6 G.L. c. 40A, § 17. See supra, § 14.9, note 2 for text. 
7 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 1011, 455 N.E.2d at 448. 
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notice of a hearing from the local zoning board, the landowner does not 
attain standing solely by receiving such notice. 11 Consequently, Reeves 
contended, a tenant's right to standing should not be decided on the fact 
that, because of their non-landowning status, tenants do not receive 
notice by mail. 12 The only conceivable reason to deny a tenant standing, 
according to Reeves, was because tenants are only residents who lack the 
long-term neighborhood interest of landowners. 13 Reeves argued that this 
reason had little application in a rent control jurisdiction such as Cam-
bridge.14 The Cambridge Rent Control Act, according to Reeves, gives a 
tenant at will under rent control the right to stay in an apartment in-
definitely, absent a violation of the terms of his tenancy as set out by the 
Act.l5 The Act's guarantee of tenure and moderate rents in rent-control 
jurisdictions, Reeves contended, assures tenants a long-term interest in 
their neighborhood. 16 
In addition, Reeves argued that the purpose of the Rent Control Act is 
to protect in part moderate income persons such as himself from eviction 
due to building conversion. 17 The ordinance prohibits the removal of any 
controlled rental unit from the rental market unless the Rent Control 
Board issues a permit. 18 According to Reeves, in deciding whether to 
grant a permit, the board considers "any aggravation of the shortage of 
decent rental housing accommodation, especially for families of low and 
moderate income ... which may result from their removal." 19 The vari-
ance as it affects him, Reeves argued, may therefore undermine one of the 
ordinance's purposes by making housing unavailable for him, a 
moderate-income tenant. 20 The ordinance, according to Reeves, should 
be read as giving standing to a person who may lose his statutory protec-
tion by the issuance of a variance:21 
In response, the defendant Cambridge relied primarily on precedent to 
support its decision to grant the variance. Citing CHR General, Inc. v. 
Newton,22 the defendant stated that because a building composed of 
11 Brief for Plaintiff at 7. Reeves had based this argument on Maratta v. Bd. of Appeals of 
Revere, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 326 N.E.2d 348 (1975), which is discussed in Huber, Zoning 
and Land Use, 1975 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 19.5 at 526. 









21 /d. at 12. 
22 387 Mass. 351, 439 N.E.2d 788 (1982) (zoning ordinances deal with use of land and 
conversion of building from rental units to condominiums results in no change in use of land 
on which building located). 
22
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townhouse units does not involve a different use of land from the build-
ing's use as rental units, no change in use was anticipated that would 
create a grievance giving rise to a remedy under chapter 40A, section 17.23 
In addition, the defendant cited cases from other jurisdictions in which a 
tenant without a lease was afforded less judicial protection than a tenant 
with a signed lease when seeking standing.24 
The Appeals Court did not find Reeves' equity arguments compelling. 
Instead, relying upon the common law of Massachusetts and other juris-
dictions, the court found the complaint properly dismissed.25 According 
to the court, Reeves was not a "person aggrieved" under the statute, and 
lacked standing to bring the suit. 26 
The Reeves decision is significant particularly because of the court's 
refusal to extend the principles of Flynn v. City ofCambridge.27 In Flynn, 
the Supreme Judicial Court noted that a serious housing emergency 
existed in Cambridge, causing the removal from the housing market of 
low to moderately priced rental units.28 The Court concluded that Cam-
bridge was therefore authorized to enact an ordinance restricting the 
23 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 1012, 455 N.E.2d at 449. 
24 Brief for Defendant at 12. Nicholson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 278, 140 
A.2d 609 (1958) (lessee has standing to contest a variance); Ralston Purina Co. v. Zoning Bd. 
of Westerly, 64 R.I. 197, 12 A.2d 219 (1940) (lessee has standing to contest issuance of 
building permit); Richman v. Philadelphia Zoning Bd., 391 Pa. 254, 137 A.2d 219 (1940) 
(commercial tenant under five year lease has standing to apply for variance). See also 
Gallagher v. Zoning Bd. of Pawtucket, 95 R.I. 225, 186 A.2d 325 (1982) (tenant at sufferance 
without sufficient property interest to apply for variance); City of Little Rock v. Goodman, 
222 Ark. 350, 260 S.W.2d 450 (1953) (tenant at will not considered real party in interest). 
25 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 1012, 455 N.E.2d at 448. 
26 /d. In support of its decision, the court cited several cases. In Redstone v. Bd. of 
Appeals of Chelmsford, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 416 N.E.2d 543 (1981), the plaintiff bank 
objected to a variance allowing a competitor bank to use a side yard as a parking lot. /d. at 
351, 416 N.E.2d at 543. The plaintiff's sole objection was that he could see the parking lot 
from the northern corner of his building. /d. at 352, 416 N .E.2d at 543. The court found this 
insufficient to establish the plaintiff as a "person aggrieved under the statute." /d. at 353, 
416 N.E.2d at 544. In the second case, Owens v. Bd. of Appeals of Belmont, 11 Mass. App. 
Ct. 994, 418 N.E.2d 635 (1981), the Appeals Court held that owners of property far removed 
from the site of a proposed condominium conversion had no standing under G.L. c. 40A, § 
17 to challenge the town of Belmont's variance grant. /d. at 994-95, 418 N.E.2d at 637. The 
third case relied upon by the court was Circle Lounge and Grille, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals of 
Boston, 324 Mass. 427, 86 N .E.2d 920 (1949). In Circle Lounge, the plaintiff objected to a 
variance which allowed establishment of a Howard Johnson's restaurant near his own 
restaurant. !d. at 429, 86 N.E.2d at 922. The Court held that where a person's sole interest is 
to prevent business competition, he is not a "person aggrieved." /d. at 429, 86 N.E.2d at 
922. See Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1981 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 11.3, at 249 for a 
discussion of these cases and standing as a person aggrieved. 
27 383 Mass. 152,418 N.E.2d 335 (1981). See Schlein, Real Property and Conveyancing, 
1981 ANN. SuRV. MASS. LAW,§ 4.3, at 105. 
28 383 Mass. at 157, 418 N.E.2d at 337. 
23
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removal of rental units from the market under the enabling act. 29 The 
Flynn Court also noted that rent control was specifically enacted to 
protect low and moderate income tenants.30 The Appeals Court in Reeves 
distinguished Flynn, stating that the ordinance in Flynn concerned rent 
control and not zoning.31 According to the Reeves court, zoning ordi-
nances deal with use, and a variance granted to permit townhouse conver-
sion does not change the use of the land upon which the townhouse 
rests.32 ~ 
In Reeves, the court applied the general rules of standing and concluded 
that tenants at will have an insufficient property interest to contest a 
landowner's desire to convert a building from apartments to town-
houses. 33 The court's reasoning suggests that the Massachusetts courts 
may be more willing to confer standing upon a tenant with a signed lease 
than upon a mere tenant at will or at sufferance. Even though tenants at 
will in housing under rent control have no standing to contest a variance 
which effectively takes the property out of the housing market, munici-
palities may still restrict the property right of a landlord to convert an 
apartment building into other types of housing. 
§ 14.11. Statutory Construction - Filing of Decisions - Appeals -
Timeliness. In Capone v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Fitchburg ,1 the 
Supreme Judicial Court addressed two appeals involving the interpreta-
tion of chapter 40A, sections 15 and 17.2 The first case concerned section 
15, which addresses the circumstances under which a petition for zoning 
relief may be considered constructively granted due to the inaction of a 
zoning board of appeals.3 On July 16, 1980, the Fitchburg superintendent 
of buildings informed Capone that he was wrongfully operating a com-
mercial landscaping business at his home, located within a residential 
zoning district.4 Capone filed a petition on September 10 with the Fitch-
burg Board of Zoning Appeals (the "Board") seeking a determination that 
29 !d. at 157, 418 N.E.2d at 338. 
30 383 Mass. at 153, 418 N.E.2d at 337. 
31 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 1012, 455 N.E.2d at 449. 
32 !d. at 1012, 455 N.E.2d at 449 (citing CHR General, Inc. v. Newton, 387 Mass. 351, 
356-57, 439 N.E.2d 788, 791 (1982)). 
33 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 1012, 455 N.E.2d at 448. 
§ 14.11. 1 389 Mass. 617, 451 N.E.2d at 1141. 
2 /d. at 618,451 N.E.2d at 1141-42. The Court decided the cases together upon finding that 
they involved the same parties and arose from the same facts./d. at 619,451 N.E.2d at 1142. 
3 /d. at 618, 451 N.E.2d at 1142. G.L. c. 40A, § 15 provides that "The decision of the 
board shall be made within seventy-five days after the date of the filing of an appeal .... 
Failure by the board to act within said seventy-five days shall be deemed to be the grant of 
the relief, application or petition sought . . . . " 
4 /d. at 619, 451 N.E.2d at 1142. 
24
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his home was not being used in violation of town zoning ordinances.5 On 
October 20, a public hearing was held at which the Board voted to deny 
Capone's petition.6 A written decision was filed by the Board on Novem-
ber 6, which was 110 days after the Board had publicly made its oral 
decision.7 
On January 16, 1981 Capone filed a complaint in the district court of 
Fitchburg, maintaining that, because the Board had not formally filed its 
decision with the city clerk within seventy-five days of rendering it, as 
required by law, Capone's original request was constructively granted.8 
Capone moved for summary judgment.9 Dennis and Joan Syriopoulos, 
who owned land adjacent to Capone, filed, and were granted, a motion to 
intervene. 10 The disttict court granted Capone summaty judgment on June 
4, 1981, and both the Syriopouloses and the Board appealed. 11 The appel-
late division of the district court affirmed summary judgment. 12 Subse-
quently, the Syriopouloses appealed the decision to the Supreme Judicial 
Court.13 
In addition to that action, the Syriopouloses filed a separate complaint 
on June 25, 1981 in the district court, intending to appeal under chapter 
40A, section 17.14 In response, Capone filed a motion for summary judg-
ment and a motion to dismiss, alleging that the Syriopouloses so-called 
"appeal" was not timely because it had not been filed within twenty days 
after the Board had constructively granted Capone's petition. 15 Section 17 
requires that appeals to the district or superior courts be made within 
"twenty days after the decision has been filed in the office of the city or 
town clerk." 16 The superior court denied Capone's motions and entered 
judgment for the Syriopouloses, ruling that Capone's use of his land 
violated the Fitchburg zoning ordinancesY 
The first issue addressed by the Supreme Judicial Court was whether 
the Board's failure to file its written decision in a timely manner as 
mandated by section 15 resulted in a constructive grant of the relief 
5 ld. 
6 ld. 
7 Id. at 619-20, 451 N.E.2d at 1142. 
8 Id. at 620, 451 N.E.2d at 1143. See G.L. c. 40A, § 15. 





14 I d. The complaint was filed against both the Board and Capone. /d. The Syriopouloses 
contended that once the district court had entered summary judgment for Capone, they 
became "persons aggrieved." I d. 
15 Id. at 620-21, 451 N.E.2d at 1143. 
16 G.L. c. 40A, § 17. 
17 389 Mass. at 620, 451 N.E.2d at 1143. 
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sought.18 In relevant part, section 15 states: "The decision of the board 
shall be made within seventy-five days after the date of the filing of a 
petition .... Failure by the board to act within said seventy-five days 
shall be deemed to be the grant of the relief . . . . '' 19 The Court refused to 
apply the reasoning in Cullen v. Building Inspector of North 
Attleborough,20 which held that filing time-tables establish only a direc-
tory procedure and not a mandatory one.21 Instead, the 9ourt noted that 
in Casasanta v. Zoning Board of Appeal of Milford,22 it had determined 
that the statutory period for filing had been extended since Cullen and that 
therefore "the softening influence of the Cullen case was removed. " 23 
Moreover, the Capone Court noted, Rinaudo v. Zoning Board of Appeals 
of Plymouth24 subsequently held that the language of chapter 40A, section 
15, requires a board to decide within the statutory period, and if it exceeds 
this time limit, the petitioner prevails by default.25 The Court then found 
that a constructive grant of a petition also results when a board makes a 
decision within the seventy-five day limit, but fails to comply with the 
statutory requirement of filing the decision within fourteen days. 26 Ac-
cording to the Court, this interpretation was supported by the mechanics 
of judicial review found in chapter 40A, section 17 which, in part, states 
that a person aggrieved by a board's decision must bring an action 
" 'within twenty days after the decision has been filed in the office of the 
... town clerk.' " 27 The Court concluded that the time for appeals must 
be limited to a definite period, even when a board does not file its decision 
with the town clerk within the statutory time period, in order to avoid a 
potentially unlimited appeal period and a possible cloud on a landowner's 
18 /d. at 621, 451 N.E.2d at 1143. 
19 G.L. c. 40A, § 15. See supra note 3. 
20 353 Mass. 671, 234 N.E.2d 727 (1968). See Huber and Mills, Land Use Planning Law, 
1968 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw§ 12.1, at 341. 
21 353 Mass. at 679, 234 N.E.2d at 731. 
22 377 Mass. 67, 384 N.E.2d 1218 (1979). 
23 /d. at 70, 384 N.E.2d at 1220. 
24 383 Mass. 885, 421 N.E.2d 439 (1981). 
25 /d. at 885, 421 N.E.2d at 440. 
26 389 Mass. at 622, 451 N.E.2d at 1144. The Court noted that it was not deciding whether 
the fourteen day time limit began immediately following the rendering of a decision by a 
board or on the last day of the seventy-five day period within which board action is 
permitted. !d. at 622 n.7, 451 N.E.2d at 1144 n.7. 
27 /d. at 23, 451 N.E.2d at 1144 (quoting G.L. c. 40A § 17) (emphasis supplied). See 
Building Inspector of Attleborough v. Attleborough Landfill, Inc., 384 Mass. 109, 423 
N.E.2d 1009 (1981). TheAttleborough Landfill Court addressed the applicability of G.L. c. 
40A, § 9 to a zoning ordinance forbidding the operation of a landfill in a residential area. /d. 
at 109-10, 423 N.E.2d at 1010. The Court found that the filing of a board's decision on a 
petition with the city clerk is the final action on an application for a special permit and is 
required to limit the time within which appeals may be made. /d. at 112-13, 423 N.E.2d at 
1011. See also, Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1981 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 11.6, at 256. 
26
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1983 [1983], Art. 17
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1983/iss1/17
§ 14.11 ZONING AND LAND USE 445 
right to use his property. 28 Consequently, the Court affirmed the district 
court's decision that Capone's petition had been constructively granted.29 
In the second case, the issue was "what event begins the twenty-day 
period during which a person aggrieved by a decision of the board of 
appeals may seek judicial review under chapter 40A, section 17. " 30 The 
Court decided the question on procedural grounds and failed to reach the 
merits of the issue.31 Section 17, the Court noted, states that an aggrieved 
party may appeal "by bringing an action within twenty days after the 
decision has been filed in the office of the city or town clerk."32 The 
Syriopouloses had argued that they were not "persons aggrieved" as 
required by section 17 at the time the board filed its decision, but only 
became aggrieved when Capone was constructively granted zoning re-
lief.33 The Court found this argument inapposite, noting that section 17 
provides for appeal of "a decision of the board of appeals," not from a 
decision of the court.34 The Court then concluded that the superior court 
had no jurisdiction to hear the Syriopouloses' "appeal" and that the 
complaint should have been dismissed.35 
The Capone decision demonstrates the Court's view that the statutory 
limits established by the Legislature should be strictly followed. As the 
Court noted, the purpose of chapter 40A, section 15 was to force zoning 
boards of appeals to act promptly on petitions for relief.36 Because action 
on a petition is not final until all steps are completed, including the filing of 
a decision with the city clerk, the Court found that boards who fail to file 
within the mandatory seventy-five days must pay the penalty of having 
the petition constructively granted. This decision avoids the possibility 
that a petitioner may have a "cloud" on its property rights due to a 
board's negligent failure to file its decision and the subsequent delay in the 
commencement of the appeals period.37 The Court's interpretation of 
chapter 40A, section 15 is thus consistent with the Legislature's purpose 
in enacting the provision - to assure prompt action on all zoning peti-
tions.38 




32 /d. (citing G.L. c. 40A, § 17). 
33 /d. at 625, 451 N.E.2d at 1145. 
34 /d. 
as /d. 
36 /d. at 623, 451 N.E.2d at 1144. 
37 See id. 
38 !d. (citing Noe v. Bd. of Appeals of Hingham, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 103, 430 N.E.2d 853 
(1982) (Dreben, J., dissenting)). 
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§ 14.12. Land Court- Jurisdiction. In Banquer Realty Co. v. Acting 
Building Commissioner of Boston, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court consid-
ered whether the land court had jurisdiction to hear a suit that involved 
the revocation of various construction permits.2 On March 27, 1981, the 
plaintiffs were granted various permits for the construction of a concrete 
hatching plant in Dorchester.3 Subsequently, the defendant, the acting 
building commissioner of Boston, informed the plaintiff that the permits 
had been issued in error and, as a result, all construction must cease.4 The 
alleged error concerned the proper category of the permits under "Use 
Items" in the Boston Zoning Code.5 The original permits were granted 
under Use Item 68, which allows a use as a matter of right. Use Item 70, 
the category the acting commissioner later determined applied to the 
plaintiffs, requires a special permit, and is therefore conditional in na-
ture.6 
On April22, 1981, the plaintiffs brought suit in the land court pursuant 
to chapter 240, section 14A and chapter 185, section 1G 1/2).7 Section 14A 
of chapter 240 states that "the owner of a freehold estate in possession in 
land may bring a petition in the Land Court against a city or town wherein 
such land is situated .... " 8 Chapter 185, section 1G 1/2) provides that the 
"land court department shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of ... 
complaints under section 14A of chapter 240 to determine the validity and 
extent of municipal zoning ordinances, by-laws and regulations."9 The 
plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from interfering 
with the construction of the hatching plant and an order forcing the 
issuance of the necessary permits.10 The trial judge determined that the 
permits were correctly issued and that the subsequent revocation of these 
permits was erroneous Y The judge found that the site of the proposed 
hatching plant was located in the middle of an industrial area. 12 This area, 
the judge noted, was accustomed to a heavy traffic flow. Furthermore, 
another company operated a hatching plant adjacent to the plaintiffs' 
property. 13 
§ 14.12. 1 389 Mass. 565, 451 N.E.2d 422 (1983). 
2 /d. at 567, 451 N.E.2d at 424. 





8 G.L. c. 240, § 14A. 
9 G.L. c. 185, § 1 (j l/2). 
10 389 Mass. at 567, 451 N.E.2d at 423. 
11 Id. at 567, 451 N.E.2d at 424. 
12 /d. at 569, 451 N.E.2d at 425. 
13 /d. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, disagreeing with the defendant's 
argument that the land court lacked jurisdiction over the claim.14 Accord-
ing to the Court, the statutory grant of section 14A allows the land court to 
determine the validity and the extent of zoning ordinances, by-laws and 
regulations which affect a landowner's proposed use of his property.1b 
The defendant argued that the land court may only hear cases where a 
litigant seeks to declare a regulation invalid on its face and not cases 
where an interpretation of a zoning code is involved. 16 In support of this 
view, the defendant asserted that in "virtually all of the reported cases 
under chapter 240, section 14A, validity challenges have been made." 17 
The Court rejected this approach, however, noting the many cases in 
which both validity and interpretation have been considered by the land 
court. 18 According to the Court, the lack of pure interpretation cases 
resulted from chance, and not from a judicial or legislative decision 
denying the land court jurisdiction over such matters.19 
The defendant next maintained that even if the land court had proper 
jurisdiction, the plaintiffs' claim should have been dismissed because they 
had not first exhausted all administrative remedies.20 The defendant con-
tended that before initiating suit in the land court, the plaintiffs should 
have appealed to the Boston Zoning Board of Appeal.21 The Court dis-
agreed, stating tliat although the general rule requires complete exhaus-
tion of all administrative remedies prior to an appeal to the courts, 
Banquer involved a statute which explicitly does not require exhaustion 
of administrative remedies.22 Observing that the issue in Banquer was not 
a question of primary jurisdiction, the Court determined that in chapter 
240, section 14A, the Legislature provided that exhaustion of all adminis-
14 Jd. at 569-70, 451 N.E.2d at 425. 
15 Id. at 570, 451 N.E.2d at 425. 
16 Jd. 
17 Jd. The Court noted that it found only one case under G.L. c. 240, § 14A where the 
validity of a regulation was not challenged- Lupo v. Stow, 350 Mass. 722, 215 N.E.2d 88 
(1%6) (petition to determine validity of zoning by-law prohibiting trailers for use as dwel-
lings). See Huber and D'Agostine, Land Use Planning Law, 1966ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAw§ 
15.2, at 193. 
18 389 Mass. at 570, 451 N.E.2d at 425-26. 
19 Jd. at 571, 451 N.E.2d at 426. See Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 
N.E.2d 891 (1972) (court must determine validity of zoning by-law that established a flood 
plain district); Huber, Land Use Law, 1972 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw. § 22.5, at 623; 
Mioduszewski v. Saugus, 327 Mass. 140, 148 N.E.2d 655 (1958) (validity of by-law providing 
that "no land shall be used except for certain purposes including farms ... " challenged); 
Twomey v. Bd. of Appeals of Medford, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 770, 390 N.E.2d 272 (1979) (suit 
seeking review of zoning board's grant of college's petition for variances); Huber, Zoning 
and Land Use, 1979 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW § 15.6, at 425. 
20 389 Mass. at 571, 451 N.E.2d at 426. 
21 Jd. 
22 Jd. at 572, 451 N.E.2d at 26-27 (citing G.L. c. 240, § 14A). 
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trative remedies through local zoning procedures was not a necessary 
antecedent to obtaining judicial relief. 23 The Court found no reason why 
the same judicial relief should not be available to a plaintiff who had 
applied for, but been denied, a permit. 
Finally, the defendant claimed that the findings of the land court were 
clearly erroneous.25 The Court noted that the issue before the land court 
was whether the proposed use was a use as a matter of right.26 According 
to the Court, Use Item 70, which requires a permit, includes " 'any use 
which is objectionable or offensive because of special danger or hazard 
because of cinders, dust, smoke, refuse matter, flashing, fumes, gases, 
vapor or odor not effectively confined to the lot ... [or] if a residential 
district is within two hundred and fifty feet of the lot, at any point inside 
such residential district.' " 27 On the other hand, Use Items 68 and 69, 
available as a matter of right, include" 'an industrial use other than a use 
described in Use Item No. 70 which does not result in noise or vibration 
perceptible without instruments more than fifty feet outside the perimeter 
of the lot.' " 28 The Court determined that the trial judge properly consid-
ered such factors as the industrial nature of the area and the fact that a 
hatching plant had previously operated in the area when deciding that the 
plaintiff could construct a hatching plan as a matter of right. 29 
§ 14.13. Frontage - Yard Space Requirements. In Sieber v. Zoning 
Board of Appeals of Wellfleet ,t the Appeals Court decided a simple case 
of statutory interpretation. The plaintiffs brought an action in superior 
court seeking judicial review of a decision by the defendant zoning board 
which, the plaintiffs claimed, was contrary to chapter 40A, section 6.2 The 
parties made cross-motions for summary judgment.3 The trial judge 
granted the defendant's motion, finding that the board had acted within its 
authority when granting the challenged building permit.4 
The defendants, the Sullivans, owned a parcel of land in a residential 
section of Wellfleet.5 A zoning by-law mandated a minimum frontage of 
125 feet and an area of 20,000 square feet for construction on a residential 
23 389 Mass. at 572-73, 451 N.E.2d at 427. 
25 Jd. at 575, 451 N.E.2d at 427. 
26 Jd. at 575, 451 N.E.2d at 428. 
27 Jd. (quoting Use Item 70 of the Boston Zoning Code). 
28 389 Mass. at 575, 451 N.E.2d at 428 (quoting Use Item 68 of the Boston Zoning Code). 
29 Jd. at 576, 451 N.E.2d at 429. 
§ 14.13. 1 16 Mass. App. Ct. 985, 454 N.E.2d 108 (1983) (rescript opinion). 
2 I d. at 986, 454 N.E.2d at 108. See infra text accompanying note 10 for G.L. c. 40A, § 6 
quoted in pertinent part. 
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lot.6 The Sullivans' lot was only 5,600 square feet in area and had eighty 
feet of frontage. 7 Nevertheless, the Sullivans were granted a building 
permit authorizing the construction of a single family house.8 The plain-
tiffs, abutting landowners, sought review before the zoning board. The 
board upheld the validity of the permit. 9 The superior court agreed with 
the board, finding its decision valid on the basis of the grandfather provi-
sion in chapter 40A, section 6, which provides that: 
Any increase in area, frontage, width, yard, or depth requirements of a 
zoning ordinance or by-law shall not apply to a lot for single and two-family 
residential use which at the time of recording or endorsement, whichever 
occurs sooner was not held in common ownership with any adjoining land, 
conformed to then existing requirements and had less than the proposed 
requirement but at least five thousand square feet of area and fifty feet of 
frontage. 10 
The Appeals Court affirmed. The court found that since the land in 
question had been in separate ownership from all abutting land since 1891, 





10 Id. at 986, 454 N.E.2d at 108-09 (quoting G.L. c. 40A § 6). 
11 !d. at 986, 454 N.E.2d at 109. 
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